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INVITED PAPER Special Section on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communication Systems
A Survey on Privacy Frameworks for RFID Authentication
Chunhua SU†, Member, Yingjiu LI††, Yunlei ZHAO†††a), Robert H. DENG††, Yiming ZHAO††††,
and Jianying ZHOU†, Nonmembers
SUMMARY Due to rapid growth of RFID system applications, the se-
curity and privacy problems become more and more important to guaran-
tee the validity of RFID systems. Without introducing proper privacy pro-
tection mechanisms, widespread deployment of RFID could raise privacy
concerns to both companies and individuals. As a fundamental issue for
the design and analysis of secure RFID systems, some formal RFID pri-
vacy frameworks were proposed in recent years to give the principles for
evaluating the security and privacy in RFID system. However, readers can
be confused with so many proposed frameworks. In this paper, we make a
comparative and survey study on the proposed RFID privacy frameworks.
We mainly divide the existing models into three categories, the four-oracle
framework, eight-oracle framework and Universal Composability frame-
work. We give a brief review on the existing models and describe their
abilities to model the adversarial behavior in RFID systems. We then ana-
lyze relations among those existing RFID privacy models and make some
comparisons among their properties.
key words: RFID security, authentication protocol, privacy
1. Introduction
RFID (Radio-Frequency IDentification) is a technology for
automated identification of objects and people using the ra-
dio wave. It has a lot of applications such as payments,
transportation, supply chain and access management. An
RFID system usually consists of three kinds of entities
(database, readers, and tags) as well as communication
channels. Normally, it is assumed that the communication
channels between readers and database are secure. RFID
reader/tag authentication is the major functionality for RFID
system. In such authentication protocols, the RFID tags
have to authenticate themselves to a reader, in the case of
mutual authentication, the reader needs also to authenticate
itself to the tags in such a way that they are assured of each
other’s identities.
For an RFID protocol, it must be authenticated and
identified correctly by legitimate users (the completeness
property), and that cloned/counterfeited tags or readers must
be detected and rejected (the authentication property). Fur-
thermore, most applications legitimately require that au-
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thentications remain anonymous (and even untraceable) for
other entities, so that tags cannot be traced (the privacy prop-
erty). This leads to the notion of privacy-preserving RFID
authentication.
For an RFID system, it is important to provide the pri-
vacy protection, particularly when a specific tag or a set of
tags are associated with a particular person or can cause lo-
cation disclosure of both person and goods. In recent years,
many research papers are published to propose conceptual
frameworks and technique (protocol based) solutions for
such problems. So many proposals can make people con-
fused. In view of this, in this paper, we are mainly concerned
with formal provable privacy models for RFID systems and
do some comprehensive analysis on these models.
1.1 Related Works
There are many research papers about RFID privacy-
preserving protocols published in last decade, Juels pro-
vided a survey of much of the related literature in [11].
For more research papers about RFID privacy protection,
the reader can refer to Avoine’s current online bibliography
at [2]. There are many RFID privacy models proposed to
evaluate how strong privacy can be provided by a proto-
col. Avoine first formalized the adversary model in RFID
systems and proposes very general and flexible definitions
of RFID privacy [1]. Based on the adversary model of [1],
Juels and Weis defined the notion of strong privacy based on
indistinguishability of arbitrary selected two tags in RFID
systems [12]. Following these works, Ha et al. [10] pro-
posed a privacy model which is based on the unpredictabil-
ity between a real protocol transcript and the randomly gen-
erated messages from the same domain. To get a more gen-
eral privacy model, Ma et al. proposed an extended version
of the Ha et al. [10]’s model, and Lai et al. [14] further ex-
tended the model in Ma et al..
In Asiacrypt 2007, Vaudernay proposed a new frame-
work and classified the privacy models into eight cate-
gories [23], this framework aims at abstracting most previ-
ous works of RFID authentication. One year later, Paise and
Vaudernay extended Vaudernay’s model to the mutual au-
thentication scenario [19]. Very recently, based upon Vaude-
nay’s model, Canard et al. proposed an RFID privacy model
by focusing upon untraceability of tags. In [9], Deng et al.
proposed a zero-knowledge based framework for RFID pri-
vacy. Universal composability (UC) based frameworks for
Copyright c© 2012 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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RFID privacy are considered in [4], [5], [13], [20].
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we make a comparative and survey study on
the recent research results of RFID authentication security
and privacy models. Our contributions can be summarized
as follows:
• We focus on the up-to-date results of RFID authen-
tication security and privacy models, and classified
the models into three frameworks: four-oracle based
frameworks, eight-oracle based frameworks, and uni-
versally composable (UC) framework. We point out
their strong points and weak points based on the adver-
sarial behaviors and security and privacy proof tech-
niques.
• We make some summaries on the basic ideas and prin-
ciples of each privacy model and make them easier to
understand. We also pointed out some incompleteness
in the current privacy models, which provides a direc-
tion to design more reasonable models for evaluating
privacy issues for RFID authentication protocols.
2. Preliminaries
Here, we will provide the definition of RFID system and
introduce some necessary preliminaries.
2.1 RFID System Modeling
An RFID system can be formulated and modeled as follows:
1. Initiate a reader R with certain keys for verifying tags’
identities. Use an algorithm SetupReader (k) where
k is the security parameter to generate common input,
domain parameters, the key to be used in the authenti-
cation for the reader R, and initialize a database.
2. Create a set of n tags, each tag Ti having a unique IDi,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Use an algorithm SetupTag (ID) with
common input to generate tag-specific secret K and its
initial state st. When the tag is a legitimate one, the
entry (ID; K) is inserted in the database.
3. Design a 2-party protocol π between the reader and a
tag in which the reader protocol uses the common in-
put, the database, and the secret.
An RFID system RS can be considered as a tuple
(R,T, InitProcess, π), where every tag in T exchanges mes-
sages with the reader R through a protocol π after some ini-
tializing processes. A tag Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, exchanges mes-
sages with the reader R through a protocol π(R,Ti). Canon-
ically, there are 2 or 3 rounds message exchanged as shown
in Fig. 1:
Normally, we assume that in the RFID system, the
reader is secure; in other words, the legitimate reader is a
“black-box” to an adversary.
Fig. 1 RFID authentication protocol.
2.2 Adversary Modeling and Security Proof
The privacy frameworks for RFID system are based on prov-
able security in cryptography. The security definitions in the
existing works for RFID authentication protocols are built
on the traditional game-based security model. The inputs
to the adversary must be determined, and the behaviors of
the adversary are modeled using some oracles to which the
adversary can access. The protocol has to give the winning
condition: achieving the winning condition is the only way
to break the RFID authentication.
The model first sets the goal of the attack in RFID
authentication, says, under which conditions the adversary
can win, then captures the adversary’s attack as a series of
queries to some oracles which model the execution of the
protocol under the adversarial control of the adversary. The
RFID protocol is said to be secure if the probability of ad-
versary’s success is negligible. Usually, the adversary A
is modeled as a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) con-
current man-in-the-middle (CMIM) against (R,Ti) with tag
corruptions.
• The adversary’s capabilities: The capabilities are mod-
eled by the oracles to which the adversary can have
access.
• The adversary’s strategy: all possible combinations of
the oracles queries made by the adversary.
• The adversary’s goal: The adversary can successfully
trace the tags, this can be considered as the winning
condition of the adversary.
In this paper, we present the adversary’s attacks as pri-
vacy experiments which is similar to the classical definition
of indistinguishability in provable security. To model the
attacks against RFID authentication protocols, we often di-
vide the attacks into two stages. The first stage is learning
stage, in which the adversary can eavesdrop and interrupt
the communications between reader and tags, and even cor-
rupt the tags to get their internal states st during this stage.
The second stage is guessing stage, in which the adversary
outputs the results based on what they learned in the former
stage. Roughly speaking, we say that the adversary cannot
break the security or privacy of the underlying RFID authen-
tication protocol, if the advantage of adversary’s guess is no
more than choosing a random bit.
3. Privacy Frameworks Based on Four Oracles
There are four oracles that are used to model the adversary’s
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attack. These four oracles model the capability of the ad-
versary in eavesdropping and interrupting the protocol mes-
sages being communicated, and in corrupting tags to get
their internal states. In the following, we specify the basic
versions of the four oracles that the adversaryA is permitted
to query.
1. InitReader (): It makes the reader R to start a new ses-
sion of protocol π and generate a session identifier sid
and challenge message csid ∈R PCH . The reader re-
turns the session identifier sid and the challenge mes-
sage csid.
2. SendTag (Ti, sid, csid): It invokes tag Ti to start a ses-
sion of protocol π with session identifier sid and chal-
lenge message csid ∈ PCH . The tag Ti responds with
the session identifier sid and a message rsid ∈ PRS .
3. SendReader (sid, c, r): It returns the challenge and re-
sponse messages c, r with session identifier sid and (in
three-round protocol) the reader’s final message fsid.
4. Corrupt (Ti): Adversary A obtains the secret-key and
internal state information (as well as the random coins)
currently held by Ti. Once a tag Ti is corrupted, all its
actions are controlled and performed by the adversary
A.
Let O1,O2,O3 and O4 denote InitReader, SendTag,
SendReader and Corrupt oracles, respectively. Denote by
O = {O1,O2,O3,O4}. Throughout the experiments, the ad-
versary A is allowed to launch O1,O2,O3 and O4 oracle
queries without exceeding n1, n2, n3 and n4 overall calls, re-
spectively. The oracles which are used by adversary can
be used to model the eavesdropping, alteration of commu-
nication messages, replay attacks, corruption of tags, and
physical or side-channel attacks to tags.
3.1 Indistinguishability-Based Privacy Model
The indistinguishability-based (Ind) privacy model is pro-
posed by Juels et al. [12]. The goal of the adversary
in this experiment is to distinguish between two diﬀer-
ent tags within the limits of its computational power and
functionality-call bounds. The adversary uses two algo-
rithms: A1 to select a pair of target tags together with some
state information st collected in the learning stage, and A2
to interact with the reader and the challenge tag (which is
chosen randomly from the pair of target tags) and output the
final result in the guessing stage. The adversary’s behaviors
of attacking the privacy of RFID system can be modeled by
the following game:
Remark: The ind-privacy framework [12] works for
any RFID protocols, not necessarily limited to the special
3-round protocols as specified by the basic versions of the
oracles above. Also, the ind-privacy framework works even
if the adversary is allowed to learn the protocol outputs (i.e.,
whether the reader or the tag is accepted or rejected), which
corresponds to the Corrupt (π) oracle in the eight-oracle
based frameworks. As noted in [9], requiring the selected
target tags to be clean is crucial for the ind-privacy for-
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Game in Ind-Privacy Model
1. We assume that there are a reader R and a set of tags T with |T | = n
for the RFID system;
2. The adversary eavesdrops and interrupts all the communications be-
tween reader and tags. It randomly selects two target tags, and cor-
rupts other tags and gets their states using algorithm A1 in this learn-
ing stage: {Ti,T j, st} ← AO1 (R,T );
3. The adversary separates the target tags and sets T ′ = T − {Ti,T j};
4. The challenger flips a coin b ∈R {0, 1} to select one challenge tag
from the target tags, if b = 0 then Tc = Ti, else Tc = T j;
5. The adversary further queries the oracles to guess the b as b′ ←
AO2 (R,T ′, st, Tc), with the limitation that either Ti or T j cannot be
corrupted in this guessing stage.
6. The experiment outputs 1 which means it successes in the attack if
b = b′, 0 otherwise.
mulation to be sound, which is not explicitly addressed in
[12]. Also, as noted in [9], the ind-privacy framework is not
appropriate to RFID systems consisting of a single (high-
value) tag.
3.2 Unpredictability Privacy Model
In 2008, Ha et al. [10] proposed a privacy model for the
RFID location privacy, which is referred to as unpredictabil-
ity privacy (unp-privacy, in short). Their model focuses
on each round of information exchange in the authentica-
tion protocol between tag and reader. Roughly speaking, an
RFID protocol is of unp-privacy if the exchanged messages
are indistinguishable from some dummy message chosen
randomly according to some predetermined distributions.
Algorithm 2 Adversarial Game in Unp-Privacy Model
1. We assume that there are a reader R and a set of tags T with |T | = n
for the RFID system;
2. The adversary uses an algorithm A1to select a challenge tag Tc from
the n tags, and then it gets the challenge message c0 from reader to
Tc and a state: {Tc, c0, st} ← AO1 ,O2 ,O41 (R,T );
3. The challenger then sets T ′ = T − {Tc}, and flips a coin b ∈R {0, 1}
to select one challenge tag. If b = 0 then the challenger gener-
ates two pseudorandom message (r′, f ′) from some certain domains
which are used in the real protocol. If b = 1, then challenger gets
(c0, r′, f ′)← π(R,Tc, sid) from a real protocol.
4. The challenger sends (r′, f ′) to the adversary. The adversary queries
the oracles to guess the b as b′ ← AO1 ,O2 ,O3 ,O4 (R,T ′, st, r′, f ′), under
the limitation that oracle access to Tc is denied.
5. The experiment outputs 1 (which means the adversary successes in
the attack) if b = b′, 0 otherwise.
In this model, all the messages c, r, f (random gener-
ated or from real protocol) must have the same lengths and
generated from the same domains, respectively. During the
guess stage, the adversary is allowed to query O1,O2 and
O3 oracles to the challenge tag Tc in the ind-privacy experi-
ment, while it is not allowed to query any oracle to Tc in the
unp-privacy experiment.
SU et al.: A SURVEY ON PRIVACY FRAMEWORKS FOR RFID AUTHENTICATION
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3.3 Extended Unpredictability-Based Privacy Model
Ma et al. extended and refined the ind-privacy model into
so called extended unp-Privacy (eunp-privacy) model in
2009 [15]. Compared to unp-privacy model, the adversary
in eunp-privacy is allowed to challenge for w test messages
rather than only one test message as in the unp-privacy ex-
periment. The adversary uses two algorithm A1 and A2 in
the experiment. The eunp-Privacy experiment can be briefly
described as follows:
Algorithm 3 Adversarial Game in Extended Unp-Privacy
1. There are a reader R and a set of tags T with |T | = n in the system;
2. The adversaryA outputs a challenge tag Tc and the state information
using an algorithm A1: it gets {Tc, st} ← AO1 (R,T ) and sets T ′ =
T − {Tc}. Then, let st0 = st and M = {}, for i = 1 to w, (ci, sti) ←
AO1 (R,T ′, sti−1,M);
3. The challenger flips the coins, if b = 0 then for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ w, it
generates two pseudorandom message (r′i , f ′i ) from some domains,
else (ci, ri, fi) R← π(R,Tc, sidi) and sets (r′i , f ′i ) = (ri, fi), M =
M ∪ {(r′i , f ′i )}. Finally, the adversary outputs b′ ← AO2 (R,T ′, stw,M),
under the limitation that oracle access to Tc is denied to A2;
4. The experiment outputs 1 if b = b′, 0 otherwise.
For all the w test messages, the experiment uses the
same coin b ∈R {0, 1}. If b = 1, algorithm A2 is given chal-
lenge messages which are all selected from protocol mes-
sages; otherwise, A2 is given random challenge messages all
selected randomly. Later, the eunp-privacy model was fur-
ther extended by Lai et al. [14] into the mutual RFID authen-
tication, but the mutual authentication protocol proposed in
[14] was later broken by Ma [16].
Remark: Both the unp-privacy and eunp-privacy mod-
els work for a special kind of RFID protocols, i.e., 3-round
RFID protocol where the second-round message from tag
is indistinguishable from a random string (which is usually
achieved by using a pseudorandom function). This limits
the applicability of unp-privacy and eunp-privacy models.
Moreover, the unp-privacy and eunp-privacy models (im-
plicitly) prohibit the adversary to learn the protocol out-
puts, which is unrealistic in reality. That is, the adversaries
considered within the unp-privacy and eunp-privacy frame-
works are actually narrow ones as defined in [23]. This
shows that unp-privacy and eunp-privacy are incomparable
with ind-privacy in general, as in the ind-privacy experiment
the adversary is allowed to learn the protocol outputs.
3.4 Zero-Knowledge Based Model
In 2010, Deng et al. [9] proposed a new model call zero
knowledge-based (ZK) privacy model for analyzing the pri-
vacy of RFID system. The idea of the model comes from the
GMW model in the secure multi-party computation and the
zero-knowledge formulation. The idea of the model is that a
real protocol that is run by RFID reader and tags (in a world
where no trusted party exists) is secure, if no adversary can
do more harm in a real execution than in an execution that
takes place in the ideal world. Their privacy model defines
the privacy of RFID system by using two experiments, one
is the real world experiment and the other is ideal world ex-
periment. The adversary A interacts with the reader R and
tags in T via the four oracles in O; At the end of the adver-
sarial experiment,A outputs a transcript of a session.
A can use a pair of algorithms (A1, A2) and run in two
stages. In the first stage, algorithm A1 is concurrently in-
teracting with R and all the tags in T via the four oracles
in O, and is required to output a set C of clean tags, along
with some state information st, at the end of the first stage.
As formulated in [9], a clean tag is an uncorrupted tag that
is currently at the status of waiting for the first-round mes-
sage from the reader to start a new session. Between the
first stage and the second stage, a challenge tag Tc, is taken
uniformly at random from C. In the second stage, on input
st, A2 concurrently interacts with the reader R and the tags
in T ′ = T −C via the four oracles in O, and additionally has
blind access to Tc via a specialized interface I. Note thatA
cannot corrupt any tag in C in the second stage. Finally, A
gets its outputs.
Algorithm 4 Adversarial Output in Real World of ZK-
privacy
1. There are a reader R and a set of tags T with |T | = n;
2. At first, the adversary uses A1 to output a set of clean tags and the
state information: {C, st} ← AO1 (R,T ), where C = {T1,T2, . . . ,Tm} ∈
T is a set of clean tags, 1 ≤ m ≤ n;
3. g R← {1, . . . ,m}, set the challenge tag Tc = Tg and T ′ = T −C;
4. Then the adversary uses another algorithm A2 to interact with R,T ′
and Tg via four oracles and gets: viewA ← AO2 (R,T ′,I(Tg), st);
5. The experiment outputs (g, viewA), where viewA includes the public
parameters para, the random coins of A and all answers from the
oracles in O.
Note that viewA does not explicitly include the oracle
queries made by A and A’s output at the first stage, as all
these values are implicitly determined by the system pub-
lic parameter para, A’s coins and all oracle answers to A’s
queries. Recall that a clean tag is an uncorrupted tag that is
currently at the status of waiting for the first-round message
from the reader to start a new session.
Algorithm 5 Simulator in Ideal World
1. Setup the reader R and a set of tags T with |T | = n;
2. The simulator queries the oracles and uses an algorithm S 1 to out-
put a set of clean tag and gets {C, st} ← S O1 (R,T ), where C ={T1,T2, . . . ,Tm} ∈ T is a set of clean tags, 1 ≤ m ≤ n;
3. The simulator randomly selects a tag as g R← 1, . . . ,m, and sets T ′ =
T −C;
4. Then simulator uses another algorithm to interact with the reader and
tags in T via the four oracles, and gets viewS ← S O2 (R,T ′, st), where
viewS particularly includes all oracle answers to queries made by
S = (S 1, S 2);
5. output (g, viewS).
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The simulation by the simulator S = (S 1, S 2) is de-
picted with Algorithm 5. In the second stage of S, on input
st, S 2 concurrently interacts with the reader R and the tags
in T \ Tc, and outputs a simulated view, denoted viewS, at
the end of the second stage.
Informally speaking, if the outputs of real world ad-
versary and ideal world simulator are computationally in-
distinguishable, the protocol satisfies the ZK-privacy. The
definition of ZK-privacy implies that the adversary A can-
not distinguish any challenge tag Tg from any set C of tags;
otherwise, A can figure out the identity of Tg from its view
viewA, while this tag’s identity cannot be derived from any
simulator’s view viewS.
In the zk-privacy model, it is explicitly specified that
the output bits of protocol participants (which indicate au-
thentication success or failure) are publicly accessible to the
adversary. Note that, in reality, such outputs can be pub-
licly observed from the behaviors of protocol participants
during/after the protocol run or can be learnt by some other
side channels. Also, zk-privacy model applies to RFID pro-
tocols in general, without limitation to special 3-round or
pseudorandom tag-message protocols. It is shown in [9] that
zk-privacy is strictly stronger than ind-privacy. As clarified
in [9], the zk-privacy model can also be extended to capture
forward/backward privacy notions.
4. Privacy Frameworks Based on Eight Oracles
In this section, we review the frameworks of [8], [19], [23]
that use eight oracles in capturing adversarial capability.
For presentation simplicity, we refer to the frameworks pro-
posed in [19], [23] as the Paise-Vaudenay (PV) model.
4.1 The PV Model
Vaudenay et al. [23] proposed the first comprehensive pri-
vacy framework that uses eight oracles to capture the capa-
bility of adversary, which is further extended into the mu-
tual authentication scenarios in [19]. Their additional four
oracles to which adversaries can have access are as follows,
while other four oracles are the same as in four-oracle based
framework. Note that the Result oracle is also allowed in
the models of ind-privacy and zk-privacy, but is prohibited
in the models of unp-privacy and eunp-privacy. In particular,
it is noted in [9] that the zk-privacy framework can be gen-
eralized into the eight-oracle setting, where the zk-privacy
formulation with four orales (with the Result oracle embed-
ded) is mainly for presentation simplicity there.
• CreateTagb (ID): creates a free tag, either legitimate
(b = 1) or not (b = 0), with unique identifier ID.
• DrawTag (distr) → (vtag1, b1, . . . , vtagn, bn): moves
from the set of free tags to the set of drawn tags a tuple
of tags at random following the probability distribution
distr. The oracle returns a vector of fresh identifiers
(vtag1, . . . , vtagn) which allows to anonymously desig-
nate these tags. This oracle keeps a hidden table T such
that T (vtag) is the ID of vtag.
• Free (tag): The adversary moves the virtual tag vtag
back to the set of the free tags. This makes vtag un-
reachable
• Result (π): The adversary sends it a request, when au-
thentication is complete and correct, it returns 1 and 0
otherwise. As mentioned, this oracle is implicitly al-
lowed in the ind-privacy model, and is explicitly ren-
dered in the zk-privacy model (but is prohibited in the
models of unp-privacy and eunp-privacy).
The PV model defines the authentication between
RFID tags and readers, and several privacy notions that cor-
respond to adversaries with diﬀerent tag corruption abilities.
In the PV model there are two adversaries, one is an adver-
sary A who aims to break the privacy of the real RFID au-
thentication, the other is a blinded adversary B who cannot
make Launch, SendReader, SendTag, and Result queries.
In the eight-oracle based framework, the blinded adversary
B for an adversaryA is a polynomial-time algorithm which
sees the same messages as A and simulates the Launch,
SendReader, SendTag, and Result oracles to A. A blinded
adversary AB is itself an adversary who does not use the
Launch, SendReader, SendTag, and Result oracles. Infor-
mally speaking, an RFID protocol is private against an ef-
ficient adversary A within the PV-model, if there exists an-
other eﬃcient B such that |Pr [A wins] −
[
AB wins
]
| is neg-
ligible.
All adversaries are polynomial-time. According to the
limitation of using the Corrupt and Result oracles, the ad-
versaries can be classified into five classes (or eight types by
considering whether the underlying adversary is narrow or
not) within the framework of eight oracles.
1. Strong Adversaries: The adversaries who have access
to all of the oracles during the attack.
2. Destructive Adversaries: The adversaries who never
use vtag again after a Corrupt (vtag) query, which
means the adversaries destroy the tag after the corrup-
tion.
3. Forward Adversaries: The adversaries who once make
the Corrupt query can only make other Corrupt
queries.
4. Weak Adversaries: The adversaries who cannot make
the Corrupt query.
5. Narrow Adversaries: The adversaries who cannot
make the Result query.
It was proven in [19], [23] that public-key cryptogra-
phy can assure the highest level of feasible privacy in RFID:
narrow-strong and forward privacy, even with stateless pro-
tocols. [19], [23] also showed narrow-destructive privacy for
an hash chain-like protocol in the random oracle model, and
weak privacy for a simple challenge-response protocol. But,
the problem of achieving destructive privacy or forward pri-
vacy without public-key techniques are left open there.
As it is impossible to reach the strongest privacy prop-
erty against strong adversary with the capability of arbitrary
corruption within the PV-model, Ng et al. have introduced
SU et al.: A SURVEY ON PRIVACY FRAMEWORKS FOR RFID AUTHENTICATION
7
in [17] the notion of wise adversaries. These adversaries are
restrained (compared to those of Vaudenay) such that they
are not able to access twice the same oracle with the same
input, and they are also not able to access oracles where
the results can be precisely predicted. Under these assump-
tions, they prove that it is indeed possible that a scheme
ensures the strong privacy property against wise adversary.
Furthermore, the work of [17] proved the equivalence be-
tween some of the eight privacy properties of Vaudenay and
thus reduce them to three diﬀerent properties.
Remark: As noted in [9], in the PV-model the simula-
tor is not required to handle corruption queries made by the
adversary, and it is not clear how such a simulator acts upon
tag corruption queries made by an adversary. The PV-model
allows the strong adversary arbitrary corruption at any point
of protocol run, but this way forward/backward privacy may
not be achievable in this case. In formulating authentication
from reader to tag, the PV-model only considered match-
ing sessions of identical session transcripts, and did not take
the cutting-last-message attack (as clarified in [9]) into ac-
count. Also, the PV-model did not formulate adaptive com-
pleteness, with no adversarial desynchronizing attacks being
taken into account. As a consequence, the PV-model and the
ind-privacy are incomparable in general, while zk-privacy is
provably strictly stronger than ind-privacy.
4.2 Untraceability Model
In 2010, Canard et al. proposed a so-called untraceability
model [8] which is based on Vaudenay’s model. They in-
troduced a new notion called non-obvious link. A link is a
couple of pseudonyms associated to the same identifier in-
side a tag. Links are chronologically ordered in their model,
where the notation (ti, t j) means that ti has been freed be-
fore that t j has been drawn. Informally, a non-obvious link
(n.o.l.) is a link between two pseudonyms which cannot be
defined without using some hidden (or not) information in
the sent messages.
The untraceability experiment is defined as follows,
where the adversary class P belongs to strong, destructive,
weak as in the PV-model. The adversary in [8] is equivalent
to the blinded adversary of Vaudenay. Although this lat-
ter has access to the remaining oracles ( Execute, Launch,
SendReader, SendTag, Result), all the answers of these or-
acles are simulated by a Blinder who does not know any
secret values of both tags and reader.
Algorithm 6 Adversarial Behavior in Untracability Model
1. The challenger C initializes the system and sends the public parame-
ters toA.
2. A interacts with the whole system using the eight oracles, limited by
the adversary classes in PV-model.
3. The adversaryA output one link of (ti, t j).
In the model of [8], a tag can have multiple diﬀer-
ent pseudonyms in diﬀerent sessions. Informally, an RFID
scheme is private, if for any pair (ti, t j), no probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm can tell whether ti, t j correspond
to the same tag or not, where ti, t j are two pseudonyms
used in two sessions in chronological order. That is, any
polynomial-time adversary A is not able to make the link
between several authentications of a same tag [8]. [8] clas-
sified three privacy classes: (1) Standard untraceability: the
adversary does not make any corruption query. (2) Past un-
traceability: the adversary corrupts t j and use the internal
state information of t j to trace back ti. (3) Future untrace-
ability: the adversary corrupts ti and use the internal infor-
mation of ti to trace forward t j. The work [8] didn’t prove
that their future-untraceability implies the Vaudenay’s de-
structive privacy, while it is proved that the opposite is false.
It is left as an interesting open question there to prove that
future-untraceability implies the narrow-strong privacy.
Remark: As noted in [9], the framework of [8] as-
sumes that only the secret-key of the tag is revealed to the
adversary upon corruption of a tag; while most other frame-
work assume that, upon corruption of a tag, both its secret-
key and internal state (including random coins) are revealed
to the adversary. The security analysis of the RFID pro-
tocols proposed in [8], based on public-key cryptosystems,
implicitly relies upon this assumption on tag corruption (i.e.,
no random coins are revealed upon tag corruption). In the
framework of [8], no internal state updating mechanism is
given. But, without an appropriate internal state updating
mechanism, symmetric-key encryption and/or message au-
thentication code alone are almost useless in achieving past
or future privacy in accordance with the framework in [8].
5. Universal Composability Based Framework
Game-based privacy frameworks used in Sect. 3 and Sect. 4
have the advantages of easy-to-understand and simple-to-
apply in the formalization of RFID authentication protocols.
The inputs to the adversary must be determined at the be-
ginning of the adversarial experiment, and the behaviors of
the adversary are modeled using some oracles to which the
adversary has access. These models give the winning con-
dition: achieving the winning condition is the only way to
break the RFID authentication. Unfortunately, such game-
based security modes are insuﬃcient to analyze the security
of an RFID protocol when it is used as a sub-protocol in a
composite setting.
Universal composability (UC) is a powerful notion pro-
posed by Canetti [6] to describe cryptographic protocols that
behave like ideal functionality, and can be composed in arbi-
trary way. The salient feature of UC secure protocols is that
their security preserves even when it is composed with any
arbitrary protocols (captured by unpredictable environment)
concurrently in asynchronous networks (like the Internet).
In such settings, a protocol execution may run concurrently
with an unknown number of other protocols.
UC framework aims for designing protocol that meet
the security requirements in the composite setting. It is
based on simulation proof and guarantees quite strong secu-
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Fig. 2 Universal composability.
Fig. 3 The ideal functionality of RFID mutual authentication, FRMA.
rity and composability properties. The UC framework con-
siders the indistinguishability between the real world pro-
tocol execution with an arbitrary adversary and the simula-
tion in an ideal world. There is a so-called environment Z
who can set inputs to all parties and can interact with the
adversary. In the ideal world, both the reader and the tags
send inputs to a trusted party that is modeled as a functional-
ity, which executes the RFID mutual authentication protocol
and sends the outputs to corresponding parties. In the real
world, the reader and the tags run a real mutual authentica-
tion protocol without the trusted party. Informally speaking,
we say that a protocol is UC secure, if for any eﬃcient ad-
versary A in the real world there exists a simulator, which
corresponds to an adversary in the ideal world, such that no
eﬃcient environment Z can distinguish whether it is inter-
acting with protocol players andA in the real world or pro-
tocols players and the simulator S in the ideal world (See
Fig. 2.).
Some RFID authentication protocols under the UC
framework have been proposed [4], [5], [13], [20]. The ideal
functionality of RFID mutual authentication FRMA w.r.t. an
NP relation R is described in Fig. 3. In the UC framework,
the adversary can corrupt both reader and tags in the au-
thentication protocol. Diﬀerent from other frameworks, the
simulator has to simulate the reader in the ideal world.
Remark: Though the original goal of UC framework
aims for strong composability against arbitrary external pro-
tocols, the actual security guarantee of UC is quite subtle.
As clarified in [7], [24], [25], the UC security implicitly as-
sumes that the external arbitrary protocols, with which the
protocol in question is to be composed, are “independent” of
the protocol in question in the sense that they do not share
common states.† This requirement is quite strong and can
be unrealistic for protocol composition in reality. For this
reason, UC security does not necessarily imply concurrent
non-malleability by definition, which means that UC RFID
authentication does not necessarily imply ZK RFID authen-
tication. Another point is, due to the high system complexity
of UC framework, the security analysis in accordance with
the UC framework is usually more complex.
6. Conclusion and Comparisons
In this section, we compare the existing RFID privacy mod-
els and clarify the same and diﬀerent features among the
models. At first, we present the basic ideas of some existing
privacy model as follows:
• Ind-privacy model: It defines the privacy as adversaries
cannot distinguish one tag to another from any two
tags.
• Unp-privacy model: The adversaries cannot distin-
guish the messages sent between tags and reader in
the authentication from random generated strings of the
same length.
• Eunp-privacy model: This model extends the unp-
privacy by enabling the adversaries w times oracle
queries.
• ZK-privacy model: The simulator can simulate the tag
in the real world authentication, so it means any ef-
ficient adversary cannot distinguish any challenge tag
from any set of tags.
• Untracability model: Given two transcripts ti and t j,
which appeared in the RFID authentications, and a spe-
cific tag identify ID, no eﬃcient adversary can decide
whether ti and t j correspond to the same tag of ID.
• UC model: It considers the indistinguishability be-
tween the execution of an RFID protocol in the real
world and the execution in the ideal world w.r.t. an
ideal functionality. Its goal is for securely deploying
an RFID protocol (as a building module) in a high-level
more complex system.
Secondly, we present a table to compare the merits of
each model as follows (also as seen in Table 1).
6.1 Relations Among Four-Oracle Based Frameworks
• The eunp-privacy model implies the unp-privacy, and
unp-privacy also implies the eunp-privacy. Thus, unp-
privacy and eunp-privacy are equivalent [15].
• ZK-privacy implies ind-privacy, which holds uncondi-
tionally. On the other hand, there exist RFID protocols
†Some stronger version of UC framework allows limited state
sharing via some specified interfaces.
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Table 1 The comparison of privacy models.
Ind E/Unp ZK PV Untra UC
Multiple tag Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full corruption No No Yes No No Yes
Arbitrary composition No No No No No No
Fig. 4 Relations among four-oracle based models.
that are of ind-privacy but not of zk-privacy. Thus, zk-
privacy is strictly stronger than ind-privacy [9].
• It is proved in [15] that unp-privacy implies ind-
privacy. We remark that this result is imprecise. What
is proved in [15] is that unp-privacy implies a special
weakened version of ind-privacy, where adversary can-
not learn protocol outputs (which are unrealistic in real-
ity). As ind-privacy does not pose this restriction, ind-
privacy and unp-privacy are incomparable in general.
But, the reader should remind that the security guaran-
tee of UC is not absolute, which implicitly assumes the
external protocols (being composed with the protocol
in question) are essentially independent of the proto-
col at hand. Figure 4 illuminates the relations among
four-oracle base models.
6.2 Analyzing the Eight-Oracle Based Frameworks
By rendering more oracles to which adversary can have ac-
cess, the eight-oracle based frameworks can be more flexi-
ble. However, the models in eight oracles-based framework
are not required to deal with full corruption in the simu-
lation. It is not clear how such a simulator acts upon tag
corruption.
In comparison, the models in [19], [23] pose no restric-
tion on tag corruption (though it is not clear how the simula-
tor handles such adversaries), which implies that an adver-
sary can corrupt any tag at any time (possibly in the middle
of session). However, in such a case, forward/backward pri-
vacy may not be achievable if the challenge tag is corrupted
in the middle of a session; this is the reason why it is re-
quired in [9] that the challenge tag Tg must remain clean at
the moment of corruption.
The framework of [8] considers a much weak tag cor-
ruption, in the sense that upon corruption only secret-key is
leaked to the adversary. In reality, both secret-key and some
private internal state (e.g., random coins) can be revealed to
adversary upon corruption. Also, no internal state update
mechanism is given in the framework of [8]. This implies
that symmetric encryptions or MACs alone are almost use-
less for achieving past or future privacy (without appropriate
internal state update mechanisms). Indeed, all the authenti-
cation protocols proposed in [8] are based upon public-key
cryptosystems, and the security proofs there implicitly rely
upon the assumption on tag corruption (i.e., only secret-key
can be revealed upon tag corruption). Also, in the frame-
work of [8], only authentication from tag to reader is formu-
lated.
6.3 Limitations of Some Privacy Models
• Unp-privacy and eunp-privacy have much limitations:
(1) Both of them work only for special 3-round RFID
protocol, with pseudorandom second-round message
from tag. This particularly implies that public key
cryptosystems can hardly be used for achieving unp-
privacy and eunp-privacy. (2) Both models require that
the adversary cannot learn the protocol outputs, which
are unrealistic in reality. (3) These two models can only
model the privacy of one tag, they can not be used to
analyze the relations among a sets of tags.
• The ind-privacy model does not apply to RFID systems
of a single (e.g., high valued) tag.
• PV model is not well appropriate to be used for the
evaluation of practical protocols where adversary can
corrupt tags.
• The untraceability model of [8] does not allow full tag
corruption, and may also not be well appropriate for
achieving RFID authentication protocols without using
public-key cryptographic techniques.
• The UC privacy model requires the external protocols
composing with the RFID authentication protocol are
“independent” of the RFID protocol at hand. The for-
mulation of UC privacy is more abstract and less easy
to apply than oracle-based frameworks.
It remains an open problem to design a more reason-
able Protocol. We need to consider more practical attack
scenarios, which has more flexibility and stronger privacy.
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